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Abstract
The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was a step toward free trade. The
Agreement lifts bans and quotas on imports, but allows their conversion into tariff-rate
quotas (TRQs), which function like quotas. At present, many of the 1,300 TRQs
increased market access to imports, but some have preserved pre-Agreement levels of
protection. The World Trade Organization’s intent as to the administration of TRQs is
open to interpretation. This report analyzes seven administrative methods in light of
the principle of nondiscrimination. We conclude that auctions are the best way to
administer a TRQ. First-come, first-served and license-on-demand methods present a
moderate risk of biased trade. State trading organizations and producer groups that
directly administer TRQs can also bias trade. Historical allocation is the method most
likely to be discriminatory. Two case studies illustrate our conclusion.
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Note to Readers:
This report deals with administration of TRQs. Liberalization of TRQs is adressed
in another report, Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO—The Road Ahead (AER-
802), in chapter 3, “Liberalizing Tariff-Rate Quotas.”Contents
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The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (1996) initiated several major steps
toward freer trade for agricultural products, including the lifting of bans and the
removal of quotas on agricultural imports. The Agreement did not require immedi-
ate conversion of bans and quotas into tariffs; rather, it permitted them to be con-
verted into tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). A TRQ is a two-level tariff, charging one tar-
iff on a limited volume of imports and a second, higher tariff on all additional
imports. The higher tariff is often set so high that imports are not profitable beyond
the limited volume. In such cases, the TRQ functions exactly like a quota. 
The Uruguay Round stimulated the creation of over 1,300 tariff-rate quotas. Some
TRQs increased market access for imports compared with earlier levels. Many,
however, merely preserved pre-Agreement levels of protection. Thus, TRQs remain
a significant barrier to trade and will likely be a source of contentious debate in the
next round of agricultural trade negotiations. On the one hand, exporters want
TRQs removed or liberalized, while on the other, protected producers want to pre-
serve TRQs because they shield producers from greater import competition. 
Debate about TRQs can be divided into two issues: TRQ administration and TRQ
liberalization. This report considers administration. TRQs are administered in vari-
ous ways, but there is no consensus about how to administer TRQs so as to keep
them consistent with WTO principles. This report explains how TRQs operate, the
various forms of TRQ administration employed, and the rules governing TRQ
administration in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The analysis evaluates how the seven basic administrative methods perform according
to the two GATT criteria for quota administration: quota fill and nondiscrimination. 
Quota fill is the principle that quota administration itself should not inhibit
imports. That is, no rules or regulations should act as trade barriers. The analysis
finds that the risk of inhibiting quota fill is relatively minor for all methods. Some
licensing methods can result in shipments that are too small to be economically
viable, but when this problem emerges, it is usually remedied. Similarly, domestic
producer groups or state trading organizations that administer TRQs have the
capacity to inhibit quota fill. In practice, they have not abused this potential, in part
because exporters closely monitor them. 
Nondiscrimination is the principle that all imports from all countries be treated
equally. TRQs can discriminate when imports equal or exceed the in-quota volume.
When this happens, the price of imports in the importing country is more than the
world price plus the import tariff. The price difference is known as rent. Quota
rents attract suppliers that would not otherwise enter the market and thus bias the
distribution of trade. Trade shares are no longer determined by the relative eco-
nomic efficiency of competing suppliers, but rather on the basis of which suppliers
win access to the quota rent. Some administrative methods pose a greater risk of
discrimination than others. We conclude that: TRQs administered at the discretion of state trading organizations and producer
groups and TRQs allocated to suppliers based on their historical market shares
are the most likely to be discriminatory. 
 TRQs allocated by license or by first-come, first-served methods pose a moder-
ate risk of biased trade. 
 Auctioning the right to import at the in-quota tariff rate neutralizes the quota
rent. Auctions therefore are nondiscriminatory, and by this criterion, an auction
is the best way to administer a TRQ.
 Allowing the unrestricted resale of quota rights allocated by non-auction meth-
ods can substantially reduce the risk of discrimination.






This report examines the economics of administering
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). The Uruguay Round
Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
did not resolve the question of what kinds of TRQ
administration are consistent with WTO principles,
and what kinds are not. The first chapter provides an
economic and legal introduction to tariff-rate quotas.
It explains how TRQs operate and the rules governing
TRQ administration in the WTO, particularly in
regard to the two criteria of nondiscrimination and
quota fill. These criteria are employed throughout the
report. The next chapter introduces the various forms
of TRQ administration as defined by the WTO. It pre-
sents the distribution of quota-fill rates by method as
reported to the WTO for 1995 and 1996, and explains
why quota fill is not a reliable indicator of administra-
tive performance. 
The following chapter analyzes the various administra-
tive methods by the two WTO criteria for TRQ admin-
istration. It first considers the superior efficiency of
market allocation; that is, rationing a fixed supply
among competing demands by market-determined
prices, either auction bids or market-clearing prices,
with or without tariffs. Market allocation provides the
benchmark to evaluate other allocation methods. 
Other methods are divided into two groups: quasi-mar-
ket methods and discretionary methods. Quasi-market
methods can be reduced to algorithms and include
first-come, first-served; license on demand; and histor-
ical allocation. A brief case study of the U.S. sugar
TRQ provides an example of historical allocation.
Discretionary methods cannot be reduced to algo-
rithms. The importing country delegates to either a
state trading organization or a producer organization
control over the volume and sources of in-quota
imports. A case study of the Japanese Food Agency’s
administration of the TRQ for wheat provides 




A tariff quota is a two-tiered tariff. In a given period, a
lower in-quota tariff (t) is applied to the first Q units of
imports and a higher over-quota tariff (T) is applied to
all subsequent imports. The terms “tariff quota” and
“tariff-rate quota” are employed interchangeably in the
literature and in this report. Technically, tariff quota, a
more accurate description, includes specific tariffs,
while tariff-rate quota excludes them.
Tariff quotas are not considered quantitative restric-
tions because they do not limit import quantities. One
may always import by paying the over-quota tariff.
This opportunity is not available under a regular quota.
If an over-quota tariff makes imports prohibitively
expensive, it yields the same import volume as a tradi-
tional quota. If the difference between domestic and
international prices exceeds the over-quota tariff, a tar-
iff quota results in a different volume of trade than
does a standard quota. Importers profit despite paying
the over-quota tariff. Were a standard quota in place,
expanding the volume of imports over the restricted
quantity would be impossible. Because of this fre-
quently slight difference, a tariff quota is in theory less
restrictive than a standard quota. 
A tariff quota can influence the incentive to import
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1This report assumes that the international market is competitive and
the importing country employing the tariff quota is “small.” A
“small country” is one in which changes in its import volume are
insufficient to change international prices. These assumptions are
reasonable for most existing tariff quotas and they allow us to repre-
sent the international supply curve as a horizontal line. To simplify
matters further, all prices are expressed relative to W, the relevant,
international free-market price. Thus, the international price always
equals 1 and the domestic price P = Pd/W. This assumption ignores
the distinction between specific and ad valorem tariffs. Finally, we
assume TRQs apply to homogeneous products. The conclusions
derived for homogeneous products also apply to TRQs for heteroge-
neous products. For any TRQ, allowing heterogeneity increases the
risk of underfill and of a biased distribution of trade. import market consists of two horizontal lines. The
lower line represents the in-quota imports and extends
from zero to Q at the price 1 + t. The other line repre-
sents the effective supply of over-quota imports and
extends from Q to infinity at the price 1 + T. A vertical
line joins the in-quota and over-quota segments at Q,
the in-quota volume. 
The effect of a tariff quota on trade depends on the
excess demand for imports. The figure shows four pos-
sible excess demand conditions. Excess demand curves
labeled 1 to 4 represent increasing levels of import
demand. 
No trade occurs.  M1 = O
Quota is not binding  M2 < Q
Quota is binding  M3 = Q 
Quota no longer binding  M4 > Q
In the first case, domestic excess demand is insuffi-
cient to support imports at the world price, even with-
out the in-quota tariff, so imports are zero: M1 = 0. In
the second case, excess demand is sufficient to result
in imports of M2 but are not great enough to cause the
quota to bind: M2 < Q. As long as imports satisfy
domestic excess demand at a volume less than Q, the
tariff quota functions as an ordinary tariff applied at
the in-quota rate.
The tariff quota is binding in the third case. If a tariff
quota did not exist and merely a tariff applied at the
in-quota rate, imports of Q3 would result. Although
not graphed, Q1 = M1 and Q2 = M2. Were the tariff
applied at the rate of zero, imports of F3 would result (F
represents free trade). Therefore, M3 = Q < Q3 < F3.2 If
imports in the case of a binding TRQ are less than the
volume of imports with an unconstrained in-quota tariff,
then M3 units of imports must be rationed among Q3
units of demand. Rationing is the essence of TRQ
administration.
Markets ration available supplies among willing
demanders by adjusting prices. This concept is basic to
economics: the equilibrium price equates supply and
demand. Tariff quotas can be administered using prices
and market mechanisms. For example, to cause
imports to equal Q, increase the in-quota tariff to P-1.
This solution poses at least two problems. First, it
requires rather exact knowledge of domestic excess
demand elasticity and other market information to
determine the correct tariff rate. Second, market condi-
tions can change quickly, so the tariff rate must be
updated continually. 
The opportunity to import within a tariff quota and to
sell on the domestic market is an opportunity to gain a
profit without risk on each item imported. This rent
equals the difference between the domestic price and
the world price with the in-quota tariff: R = P - (1 + t).
Raising the tariff to R + t, as above, amounts to taxing
away the rent, which is difficult. One can establish a
market for the right to import within a quota, however.
If the right to import within a quota were auctioned,
potential importers would pay approximately R for the
opportunity to make a riskless profit of R.
Excess demand curve 4 represents a high level of
demand, sufficient to sustain imports at the over-quota
tariff. The volume of imports is no longer constrained
at Q. The domestic price increases to P = 1 + T.
However, the rationing problem remains for imports
within the quota. The opportunity to import at 1 + t
and sell for the domestic price of 1 + T is still avail-
able for Q units of imports. Rent equals T – t = (1 + T)
- (1 + t), the maximum possible under a TRQ. The rent
still must be rationed.






2The shaded triangle represents the deadweight welfare loss of the
tariff quota relative to an applied tariff at the in-quota rate. The
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ImportsTRQ Administration and the WTO 
Tariff quota administration is fundamentally a
rationing problem. There are many ways to ration.
How to determine the way most consistent with WTO
principles is the issue. Tariff quota administration con-
cerns how the rights to import at the in-quota tariff are
distributed. How these rights are distributed can deter-
mine the volume and distribution of trade, as well as
the distribution of quota rents. When considering tariff
quotas, one must distinguish between the volume and
distribution of trade and the volume and distribution of
rents. The WTO is concerned only with how quota
administration influences the volume and distribution
of trade; it has no direct interest in the distribution of
rents. However, the distribution of rents is important.
First, how quota rents are distributed influences the
distribution of trade. Administrative methods that sepa-
rate the distribution of quota rents from the distribution
of trade remove the trade-distorting risk posed by
quota rents. Administrative methods that award quota
rents to in-quota imports encourage a biased distribu-
tion of trade. Second, it is the distribution of rents that
motivates the politics of TRQ administration. The
choice of the method of tariff quota administration is a
political decision; many competing interests claim








The World Trade Organization identifies seven princi-
pal methods of TRQ administration (see table 1).
Member nations must notify WTO about how they
administer tariff quotas in their tariff schedules. Of the
1,368 notified tariff quotas in 1999, roughly half were
not enforced. Rather, all imports were allowed at the
in-quota tariff. The over-quota tariff may be re-applied
at will however. Of the TRQs that were enforced,
almost half were allocated by license on demand. 
Article XIII and Nondiscrimination
Article XIII of the GATT, “Non-Discriminatory
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions,” governs the
administration of tariff quotas. A reading of Article XIII
and other related documents suggests that the GATT
advocates two criteria to judge tariff quotas’proper
administration—quota fill and distribution of trade. 
Quota fill requires that imports of the in-quota volume
be allowed if market conditions permit. That is, tariff
quota administrators should not impose impediments
to imports beyond payment of the in-quota tariff.
Quota fill has a two-part test: First, was the quota
filled? If the quota was not filled, a second question is
posed: Did market conditions permit imports? (See
figure 1 for an explanation of “market conditions per-
mit” in this context.) Suppose demand curve 3 repre-
sents normal import demand, but there is an unusually
large domestic harvest. Domestic supply expands and
reduces excess demand for the product. The new
excess or import demand, 1, is drawn so that the
domestic market-clearing price equals one (the world
price), and imports are zero. In this case, the quota is
not filled for a legitimate reason—there is insufficient
domestic demand under current market conditions.
Were domestic demand to increase slightly to 2,
imports would satisfy excess demand, partially filling
the quota, an instance of legitimate underfill. In prac-
tice, the simplest second-stage test asks if the domestic
price is less than the world (border) price plus the in-
quota tariff. If so, there is clearly no excess demand
for imports. If the domestic price is greater than 1 + t
and the quota is not filled, profitable arbitrage opportu-
nities are not realized, and it is then appropriate to
inquire why. Legitimate transaction costs might be the
cause, as might the method of TRQ administration.
Patterns of Quota Fill
The WTO Secretariat routinely reports the fill rates of
notified TRQs. The reports calculate the average quota-






























































































































-fill rates by administrative method and commodity
group (dairy, grain, etc.) among other factors. Fill rates
by administrative method are provided in figure 2. The
reports do not go beyond reporting these basic descrip-
tive statistics. They refrain from drawing inferences
from quota-fill data about the relative merits of the vari-
ous administrative methods. Such restraint is appropri-
ate. It is tempting to draw conclusions from quota-fill
statistics; but caution is advised because the data are
incomplete. For example, quota-fill rates are significant-
ly higher for historical allocation and state trading 
organizations than for auction allocation. There is a
political economy of administrative choice. Govern-
ments choose an administrative method for each com-
modity. Thus, fill rates reflect factors determining a 
government’s choice of method as well as the intrinsic
properties of the administrative method used and the
commodity market conditions during the period of
observation—factors difficult to identify and separate. 
The more politically sensitive imports of a commodity
are, the greater the probability that administration will
be by discretionary methods; that is, by state trading or
by producer groups. In the Uruguay Round, many
WTO members agreed to construct minimum access
TRQs to allow imports for a specific proportion of
domestic consumption. In cases where imports had
been banned previously, minimum access TRQs pre-
sent a serious challenge to domestic producers. In
almost all cases, domestic prices greatly exceeded
world prices, and it was obvious the TRQ would fill.
Some governments have delegated the authority to
import in-quota, in part or in whole, to the domestic
industry, thus giving the industry some compensation
in the form of quota rents. For this reason, TRQs
administered by state trading organizations and pro-
ducer groups reveal higher rates of quota fill than
TRQs administered by other methods. Furthermore,
discretionary methods tend to attract the scrutiny of
potential exporters and their governments, so these
TRQs are especially well policed and, as a conse-
quence, are generally enforced to the letter of the law. 
Imports that are not particularly sensitive are generally
administered by market or quasi-market methods, or by
the most liberal means, by not imposing the over-quota
tariff at all, that is, by the so-called applied tariff
method. Likewise, for TRQs that are unlikely to fill
because the domestic price is generally below the world
price, the risk of import disruption is low and so is the
need to manage imports through discretionary means. 
Distribution of Trade 
GATT Article XIII paragraph 2 states:
In applying import restrictions to any pro-
duct, contracting parties shall aim at a distri-
bution of trade in such product approaching 
as closely as possible the shares which the 
various contracting parties might be expected
to obtain in the absence of such restrictions. . . 
This language implies the construction of a free trade
or tariff-equivalent counterfactual. That is, the parties
must attempt to determine the distribution of trade
(supplier market shares) likely to prevail if a tariff
were employed to restrict imports to Q. The adminis-
tration of the tariff quota is then evaluated by how
closely the distribution of the restricted volume of
trade (under tariff quota) approaches the counterfactual
distribution. Basically, a pie chart of supplier market
shares under a nondiscriminatory tariff quota should
look identical to the tariff equivalent pie chart. The
economic principle underlying the distribution of trade







Distribution of quota fill-rates by
administrative method
Figure 2
















  20-80 Above 80the tariff quota constraint. The GATT principle of
nondiscrimination asserts that trade shares should be
determined by the relative efficiency of suppliers and
not by alternative, discriminatory criteria. Clearly,
market allocation is the principle of distributive justice
governing TRQ administration under Article XIII: 2.
The risk of a biased distribution of trade from TRQ
administration requires an examination of the supply
side of the rationing problem. The supply side of a
quota-constrained market is shown in figure 3. Suppose
two kinds of firm can supply a market—low-cost and
high-cost. With no rationing, low-cost firms supply the
entire market of Q+ at the price PL. High-cost firms will
not enter the market. They either shut down or do some-
thing else. When a quota of Q is imposed, the demand
price increases to PH. At PH, it is profitable for high-cost
firms to enter the market. How access to the market is
administered determines which firms supply the quota-
rationed market. If access were restricted so that only
low-cost firms supplied the market, then a subset of low-
cost firms would produce Q and gain a rent of PH-PL on
each unit sold. If market access is granted on a first-
come, first-served basis, the distribution of sales by firm
will depend on being “early” rather than on being low-
cost and efficient. Figure 3 shows one possible outcome
of first-come, first-served quota-rationed market. The
model assumes each firm is equally likely to be early,
thus each type gains an equal market share. Exactly half
the area, Q · (PH-PL), is used to cover the costs of high-
cost firms, which represents an unnecessary use of
resources. It is less efficient than if low-cost firms alone
supply the market. 
One could restrict demand to Q by imposing a tax of t =
PH - PL. Such a tax or tariff results in a net price to sup-
pliers of PL = PH – t. Only firms inframarginal to PL
enter; that is, only low-cost firms supply the market.
Auctioning the right to sell to a quota-restricted market
will result in a similar outcome: low-cost firms will out-
bid high-cost firms for the right to sell at PH. Tariffs and
auctions remove the incentive for extramarginal suppli-
ers—high-cost firms—to enter the market. 
From the point of view of welfare analysis and of
GATT Article XIII, which low-cost firms or countries
inframarginal to PL gain market access within the
TRQ is of little consequence. Random displacement of
inframarginal supply by other sources of inframarginal
supply is not a problem. In an international trade con-
text, displaced inframarginal suppliers can export to
other markets at the world price. If rents are not fully
absorbed through auction, tariff, or other means, sup-
pliers extramarginal to PL will have an incentive to
enter the market, which poses a risk of extramarginal
suppliers’ displacing inframarginal suppliers.
There are two plausible counterfactual distributions of
trade implied by Article XIII. The first is the free-trade
counterfactual, the distribution of trade among compet-
ing suppliers if trade were unrestricted. The free-trade
counterfactual constructed above shows that only low-
cost firms supply the market. The second is the tariff-
equivalent counterfactual, which is constructed by
restricting the volume of trade to the quota-constrained
volume with a tariff. The GATT/WTO allows tariffs
and forbids quantitative restrictions. Replacing a quota
with its tariff-equivalent results in an identical volume
of trade, but, as shown above, a very different expected
distribution of trade. Both the free-trade and tariff-
equivalent counterfactuals result in low-cost firms’
supplying all imports. 
GATT Article XIII sets forth two normative criteria to
administer tariff-rate quotas—quota fill and distribu-
tion of trade. The two criteria raise two evaluative
questions. Which methods of allocation are most likely
to result in quota underfill? Which methods of alloca-
tion are most likely to result in a discriminatory distri-
bution of trade? The following section employs the
GATT criteria to evaluate various tariff-rate quota
administrative methods. 






















PriceEconomic Analysis of TRQ
Administrative Methods
Rationing and Markets
Tariff quota administration amounts to rationing—
which may be either efficient or inefficient. This sec-
tion examines in depth the assets and liabilities of the
seven basic methods to administer tariff quotas, partic-
ularly by the GATT criteria of quota fill and distribu-
tion of trade.
A market generates maximum surplus if all buyers and
sellers to the left of the intersection of supply and
demand curves can find each other and exchange.
Such buyers are inframarginal buyers. Their willing-
ness to pay exceeds the market-clearing price.
Extramarginal buyers, represented on the demand
curve right of equilibrium, have a willingness to pay
less than the market-clearing price. Similarly, infra-
marginal suppliers have a willingness to accept less
than the market-clearing price; extramarginal suppli-
ers, represented on the supply curve right of equilibri-
um, have a willingness to accept greater than the 
market-clearing price.
The displacement of inframarginal traders by extra-
marginal traders is the primary source of inefficiency
in TRQ administration. The availability of quota rents
provides an incentive for extramarginal traders to enter
the market. Market-based administrative methods, auc-
tions, for example, remove the incentive posed by
quota rents and thus remove the risk of displacement.
The further TRQ administration deviates from market-
based administrative methods, the greater the risk of
displacement and the greater the risk of biased trade
distribution.
Welfare Analysis of the 
Rationing Problem
The welfare analysis of various methods of TRQ
administration is illustrated in figure 4. The interna-
tional supply curve is a horizontal line at one. The in-
quota tariff (t) is applied to the first QTRQ units of
imports, which shifts the effective import supply curve
upward to 1 + t until the volume QTRQ is attained. At
the quota volume (QTRQ), there is a vertical jump in
the supply curve. Imports in excess of QTRQ are
charged the over-quota tariff (T > t), so the effective
supply curve continues at 1 + T.
For the case in which import demand is sufficient to
fill the quota, but not so great as to import at the over-
quota tariff (fig. 4), consider the differences between a
tariff quota, a simple tariff, and free trade. With free
trade, an unlimited quantity may be imported at the
world price. The domestic market clears with imports
of QF and the domestic price equal to the world price,
P = W = 1, and all demand inframarginal to P = 1 is
satisfied. The large triangle below the demand curve
and above the supply curve is the economic surplus
gained from international exchange, that is, the sum of
areas labeled: A + Rent + Tariff + B + C + D. 
Under a simple tariff, unlimited imports are allowed at
the in-quota tariff (t). The domestic market clears with
imports of Qt and the domestic price is 1 + t. Demand
inframarginal to P = 1 + t is satisfied. Domestic con-
sumers’ surplus equals the area: A + Rent + B, and the
domestic government collects the area Tariff + C in
tariff revenue. Triangle D is the deadweight welfare
loss from imposing the tariff.
The tariff quota limits imports at the in-quota tariff to
QTRQ and the domestic market clears at PTRQ,w h i c h
results in a further reduction in welfare. Domestic con-
sumers’ surplus is reduced to the triangle labeled A
and tariff revenue declines to the rectangle labeled
“Tariff.” The area “Rent” represents the arbitrage prof-
its from the opportunity to import QTRQ units at the
cost of 1 + t, while the domestic market value is PTRQ.
These tariff quota rents are the result of rationing

































Priceare neither good nor bad, they simply exist as the
result of rationing the opportunity to bridge the gap
between domestic and world prices. Because there is
no clear title to these rents, they are a common proper-
ty resource, and, as such, the fact that they exist can
stimulate wasteful rent-seeking behavior. How rights
to the rent are distributed largely determines the pat-
tern and volume of exchange.
If imports are limited to QTRQ, the greatest welfare
possible is A + Rent. Drawing the figure in this text-
book manner assumes that a market mechanism is
employed to ration QTRQ units of supply over Qt units
of demand. That is, it assumes the rent is perfectly and
automatically allocated in the best possible manner, a
strong assumption. If it does not hold, the outcome can
be far inferior to the auction allocation.3
Auction Allocation
To minimize biased trade, given a tariff-quota con-
straint on imports, extramarginal suppliers must be
excluded. This is the beneficial, discriminatory role
that prices play in free markets. The quota rent and the
incentive it transmits induces inefficiencies. Demand
inframarginal to W but extramarginal to PTRQ will
enter the market as will supply inframarginal to PTRQ
but extramarginal to W. If there were no quota rents,
only inframarginal traders would enter the market and
welfare would be maximized. An auction neutralizes
quota rents.4 The opportunity to buy something for W
and sell it for PTRQ – (1 + t) is worth R = PTRQ – (1 +
t). Inframarginal traders will bid R for the opportunity;
extramarginal firms bid less than R; and the required
discrimination is realized. 
In a TRQ auction, consumers would bid, at the margin,
R = PTRQ - (1 + t)—the difference between the domes-
tic price P (given imports of Q) and the world price
plus the in-quota tariff, 1 + t. If all winning bids are
charged the marginal winning bid (uniform price auc-
tion) then auction revenue is the shaded rectangle
“rent.” The consumers who obtain the quota rights are
those with a willingness to pay of at least PTRQ. These
consumers realize a consumer surplus equal to the area
A. The domestic economy realizes gains from trade
equal to the auction revenue plus A. This allocation is
identical to the allocation that would result from the
tariff-equivalent of a tariff quota (given market condi-
tions): t* = t + R. 
Suppose we employ an alternative allocation method,
for example, first-come, first-served (FCFS). Under
FCFS, any consumer with a willingness to pay more
than W will attempt to import the instant the tariff
quota season opens. The quota rent attracts all
importers inframarginal to W, many of whom are
extramarginal to W + R. To perform as well as an auc-
tion, alternative allocation methods must discriminate
perfectly between agents inframarginal to W + R from
those extramarginal to W + R. 
Only 4 percent of all TRQs notified to the WTO in
1999 used auctions. If auctions are so wonderful, the
question arises as to why they are so seldom used.
Economically, auctions are most likely to outperform
other rationing methods only if the market for the con-
trolled product is sufficiently liquid—if the market has
a large volume of trade and several competing traders.
As a market becomes less liquid, its capacity to func-
tion as a price-discovery mechanism deteriorates.
Illiquidity has resulted in the demise of many com-
modity futures contracts.5 Those commodities for
which active futures or cash markets exist are excellent
candidates for quota auctions. If illiquidity diminishes
the relative efficiency of an auction, then other meth-
ods, license on demand, for example, might be prefer-
able. Related to the liquidity of the market is the num-
ber of active traders. Research shows that too few
traders can diminish market efficiency, but it does not
require more than a few entrants to realize close to
100-percent efficiency. Several TRQ allocation meth-
ods specify a maximum market share that can be
obtained by any single trader. Such rules can limit the
risks of having too few traders.
There is also a political explanation for the low num-
ber of auctions. Auctions are markets, and markets can
be hard to control. If the government administering the
TRQ has strong preferences about the countries or
firms that receive quota rights, then it will choose not
to ration by auction. Similarly, if a government prefers






3This point is generally overlooked in the literature. Vousden,
1990, pp. 60-83, for example, devotes a full chapter to quotas
without considering how quota rights are allocated.
4Vickrey (1961) initiated the economic literature on auctions.
Milgrom (1989) provides a cogent introduction to the auction liter-
ature. Campbell (1995) is a lucid guide to the more important
proofs and places auctions and bidding in a demand-revelation con-
text. Bergsten et al. (1987) advocate auctioning (absolute) quotas. 
5Silber (1981), Black (1986), and Miller (1986) provide compara-
tive analyses. Working (1953) and Sandor (1973) offer case stud-
ies. For the number of traders and liquidity, see Workshop on
Double Auctions (1991) and Tomek (1980).to transfer quota rents to a certain group rather than
collecting the rents as auction revenue, it will not auc-
tion. As shown below, discretionary allocation—State
trading and producer group—provides the importing
government or industry the greatest control over the
distribution of rent and of trade.
Quasi-Market Allocation
Several allocation methods are a mix of market and
random processes. This section examines license on
demand (LD) and first-come, first-served (FCFS). It
considers, in turn, the risk these methods can pose of
quota underfill and of biased distribution of trade.
License on Demand
License-on-demand allocation generally operates in
the following manner. Before the quota period begins,
potential importers are invited to apply for import
licenses. Applicants specify the quantity of imports
they want. Call the ith applicant’s demand qi*, and call
the sum of all import application requests Q* = Sqi*.
If domestic demand is sufficient, the quota binds: Q*
> QTRQ = lQ*. To ration license supply among
license demand, application quantities are reduced
proportionally by the factor l < 1. If one applies for
q* units and the quota is binding, then a license is
granted for lq* units of imports at the in-quota tariff.
Many countries also specify a minimum license
amount, so that the allocation rule reads: lq* units but
no less than g units. This minimum quantity rule can
prevent the minimum shipload problem discussed
below and in the appendix.
Quota Fill. The proportional reduction of requests
complicates importing. First, if a trading firm accurate-
ly states its desired import volume and the quota is
binding, it gets less quota than desired, which creates
an incentive to overstate license requests. If all appli-
cants overstate by the same proportion, the final alloca-
tion of shares is not affected. If the degree of overstate-
ment is not uniform, however, shares will be reallocat-
ed. In any event, uncertainty makes planning unneces-
sarily difficult.
Second, shipments of goods are generally conducted in
units such as full truck or full container loads. Unit
transport costs are less, as a rule, if loads are full,
because shipping has substantial fixed costs. Typically,
a license request will be for a multiple of full loads,
say, for L* containers. With proportional reduction,
only lL* containers will be licensed for import at the
in-quota tariff. Except in the rare case that lL* results
in an integer, proportional reduction will cause a
remainder of one less-than-truckload shipment for
each license application. Assuming for the moment
that licenses cannot be divided and traded following
initial allocation, shippers holding rights to a less-than-
truckload shipment face what amounts to a rounding
decision. Above some fraction of a full load, say, 80
percent, it is still profitable to ship, so the products are
shipped. Below the critical load of 80 percent, the
shipment is not made and the less-than-truckload por-
tion of the license is not used. These unused remain-
ders can result in underfill. 
Distribution of Trade. The risk of a biased distribution
of trade from TRQ administration requires an exami-
nation of the supply side of the rationing problem (fig.
5). To reduce clutter, assume that the in-quota tariff is
zero; that the over-quota tariff is prohibitive, given
market conditions; and that the domestic market clears
at the price P. The unit quota rent is R = P - W. The
figure plots an upward sloping supply curve “S.” The
supply elicited at price P is normalized to one.
The area under the supply curve represents payments
to factors employed to produce the traded product.
Suppliers extramarginal to W must spend more than W
per unit to employ labor, capital, and other productive
resources to produce a unit of output with a market
value of only W. Rather than adding value, extramar-
ginal production destroys value. This economically
wasteful misallocation of resources is represented by
the shaded triangle: extramarginal factor use. 
License-on-demand allocation may be thought of as a
form of lottery. All firms inframarginal to P have an
incentive to enter the quota lottery. The sum of appli-
cations, as shown above in the analysis of underfill,
exceeds the supply of quota: Q* = 1 > QTRQ = l. Each
applicant wins a pro rata share of the global quota, that
is, lq* units. The effective supply curve for this uni-
form allocation of quota rights is S0. The proportion of
quota rights granted to suppliers inframarginal to W is
b. Given the assumptions made, LD allocation causes
the displacement of l(1 - b) inframarginal suppliers by
l(1 - b) extramarginal suppliers. This expected distrib-
ution of trade differs from the tariff equivalent counter-
factual distribution, which consists exclusively of
inframarginal suppliers. The welfare loss from LD
allocation is shown by the shaded triangle below S0.
This welfare loss can be interpreted as an indicator of
how the expected distribution of trade differs from the






❖  	maximum surplus possible is realized by market (auc-
tion) allocation. Reductions in welfare from this maxi-
mum occur because of the displacement of inframargin-
al suppliers by extramarginal suppliers. The greater the
degree of displacement, the greater is the reduction in
welfare, and the greater the difference in the distribution
of trade from the counterfactual standard.
First Come, First Served
The standard FCFS allocation allows importation at
the in-quota tariff until the quota has been filled. If
domestic demand is sufficient to fill the quota, then
there is one individual shipment that fills the quota;
that is, there is one last shipment that will be fully or
partially over-quota. Call this last in-quota shipment
the nth shipment and represent its volume as qn. The
tariff charged on the nth shipment is variable: the first
n-1 shipments enter at the in-quota tariff; only a por-
tion (a) of the nth shipment enters at the in-quota rate
with the over-quota balance (1-a) being charged the
over-quota tariff; and for shipments after n, the over-
quota tariff is applied.
Quota Fill. Being the claimant of the nth shipment can
be rather costly. Consider some of the alternatives. If it
is costly to break the shipment—suppose it is a con-
tainer or truckload—then the importer must choose
whether to cease importing and route the whole ship-
ment elsewhere or to pay the over-quota tariff on the
proportion over-quota. If the shipment can be broken,
then the over-quota portion can be shipped elsewhere,
or forfeited at the border, leaving only the in-quota
portion to be imported.
The system just described assumes that all customs
agents have timely and accurate information on the level
of quota utilization. Several countries have unified elec-
tronic monitoring systems and it is possible to identify
and inform the nth shipper prior to clearing customs.
Many countries lack such systems, however.
Information that the quota has been filled is disseminat-
ed to customs offices days, weeks, or sometimes months
later. It is possible to clear a shipment at the in-quota
tariff and be notified later that payment of the tariff dif-
ference (T - t) is due on each unit previously cleared.
This additional charge will be levied only on shipments
after the nth shipment, with the nth shipment liable for
payment on (1 - a)qn. If a shipment is fully over-quota
only after the fact, it is generally impossible to “un-
import” the shipment and avoid an extra tariff. If the
over-quota tariff is significantly higher than the in-quota
tariff, the cost of being nth or later is very high. In the
absence of timely information on quota fill, potential
importers may avoid shipping if they believe that the
quota is close to being filled and the risk of being
caught over-quota is high. This rational risk-aversion
can result in a lack of quota-fill, even when domestic
prices exceed the in-quota landed value.
From the point of view of the government’s choosing
to administer via FCFS, there are incentives to delay
notification. If collecting tariff revenue is a priority,
then sending the signal that the quota is not filled
when in fact it is can entrap importers at the over-
quota tariff. If protecting the domestic import-compet-
ing industry is a priority, sending the signal that the
quota is filled when in fact it is not will inhibit imports
within the quota and yield the desired extra protection.
Another disadvantage of first-come, first-served alloca-
tion is that it can disrupt markets. For example, the
U.S. peanut TRQ is administered on a first-come, first-
served basis. The quota year starts April 1 and ends
March 31 of the following year. Figure 6 plots the
monthly distribution of quota fill for the U.S. peanut
TRQ, which surges in April.6 Three costs can result
from these induced import surges: 1) an unnecessary
dip in domestic prices; 2) unnecessary domestic stor-
age costs; and 3) other, unnecessary rent-seeking costs
induced by the existence of a common resource.
Distribution of Trade. To analyze FCFS allocation,
some assumptions must be made about the relationship
or correlation between a supplier’s willingness to sup-
ply and its place in the FCFS queue. If a lower cost
supplier always places ahead of every higher cost sup-
plier, then, in figure 5, the effective quota supply curve
is identical to the original supply curve (S) in the inter-
val (0, l): S*. However, because all suppliers can sell
on the international market, W becomes the lower
bound on the willingness to supply the TRQ market
for suppliers inframarginal to W. If each inframarginal
supplier is equally likely to supply the TRQ market, it
amounts to a random drawing from among the set of
inframarginal suppliers (an operational test of nondis-
crimination). Such a random drawing yields the effec-
tive quota supply curve: S+. Such a selection process
also achieves efficient discrimination between infra-
marginal and extramarginal suppliers and produces an
expected distribution of trade equivalent to an auction
allocation. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult






6Skully (1999) analyzes in depth the U.S. TRQs for peanuts,
peanut paste, and peanut butter.to conceive how such an efficient sorting of applicants
could be achieved outside of using an auction.7
These two FCFS allocations (S* and S+) assume that
there is a perfect correlation between lower cost and
place in the queue. This is a strong assumption, but it
is not implausible to assume that there might be some
imperfect correlation. License-on-demand allocation,
discussed previously, is equivalent to FCFS allocation
when there is zero correlation between cost and rank: a
random selection of b units from a population uni-
formly distributed over the interval (C, P) has the
expected distribution represented by the curve S0. An
FCFS process with a positive but imperfect correlation
will generate an expected allocation of quota rights
among suppliers which may be represented by a sup-
ply curve drawn within the area bounded by S+ and S0
over the range (0, l).8 In sum, if an FCFS process gen-
erates a positive yet imperfect correlation between low
cost and place in the queue, then there is some expect-
ed inframarginal displacement. The lower the correla-
tion, the greater the expected displacement.
Finally, consider the perverse case in which higher
cost suppliers tend to queue before lower cost suppli-
ers. This is not as implausible as it might seem. One
could argue that rent-laden markets are the only mar-
kets where extramarginal producers can hope to cover
their factor payments, so they may specialize in getting
to the front of tariff quota queues. The necessary
assumption is that loss aversion provides a greater
incentive than profit maximization. When low cost is
perfectly and inversely correlated with place in queue
(i.e., r = -1), the expected outcome may be represent-
ed by the supply curve marked S-. This is the worst
possible outcome, from a welfare and an Article XIII
perspective. It results in the lowest realization of pro-
ducers’ surplus possible, given that the quota fills—all
inframarginal suppliers are displaced by the “most”
extramarginal suppliers. The triangle above S- is the
producers’ surplus realized by the most extramarginal
suppliers. It is equivalent to the shaded triangle in the
upper right corner of the graph. The area below S- in
the range (0, l) represents wasted resources and con-
stitutes a welfare loss. Moreover, as established above,
it indicates a biased distribution of trade relative to the
counterfactual norm.
To summarize, this section surveys the quota fill and
distribution of trade effects possible under auction,
license-on-demand, and FCFS allocation. It shows that
auction and license on demand, given the assumptions,
are special cases of a general FCFS process. An auc-
















U.S. peanut imports under TRQ, volume
by month
Figure 6
7Vickrey (1961) proves that the only allocative mechanism that
will guarantee this result is a uniform (second) price auction, now
commonly known as a “Vickrey auction.”
8The supply curve is a cumulative distribution of willingness to
accept or to supply; it is a piecewise continuous, monotonically
non-decreasing function. As the value of Pearson’s r or Kendall’s
t￿ranges from zero to one, the corresponding supply curve rotates
















β λbetween low cost and place in queue. Such perfect
sorting is not possible without recourse to an auction,
however. License on demand is equivalent to a random
FCFS process, with a zero correlation between cost
and place in queue. The next section shows how his-
torical allocation can also be characterized as a variant
of FCFS allocation.
Historical Allocation
Historical allocation can be viewed as an extreme form
of an FCFS process. FCFS and LD are annual lotteries.
Each quota season there is a new drawing of applicants
inframarginal to P. After several draws, the average real-
ization will converge to its expected value. Historical
allocation, in contrast, is essentially a one-time-only
drawing. The historical base is infrequently revised: one
particular realization is sustained for many years and
remains invariant to changing market conditions. For
example, exporter shares of the quota for U.S. sugar
imports were first allocated in 1934 on the basis of trade
volumes in 1931-33. Save for wartime controls, the allo-
cation was essentially unchanged until 1948. Legislation
in 1948 and 1956 made minor adjustments to the shares
of the two major suppliers, Cuba and the Philippines.
The trade embargo imposed on Cuba after the Cuban
Revolution forced a re-assignment of the large Cuban
share in 1961. It was formally reallocated in 1965 to
countries other than the Philippines in proportion to their
shares of the trade in 1963 and 1964. This allocation
remained until 1974 when the 1948 quota was not
renewed: imports were no longer limited by quota. A
binding quota was re-imposed in 1982 on the basis of
trade shares during 1975-81. This allocation was trans-
ferred unaltered into a tariff quota in 1995 and remains
in effect. Each major change was prompted by an eco-
nomic or political shock that, in each case, altered the
structure of the sugar market. Despite this, the allocation
of shares was based on the pattern of trade prevailing
before the change. On average, there have been about 15
years between major reallocations. The U.S. sugar TRQ
is considered below in a case study in which the extent
of misallocation is calculated.
Article XIII and Historical Allocation
The discussion of Article XIII (beginning on p. 4)
emphasized its advocacy of nondiscrimination. The
analysis above has established that auctions, if practi-
cable, are the best way to assure a non-discriminatory
distribution of trade in a quota-constrained market.
FCFS and license on demand are inferior to auctions,
and will generally result in a biased distribution, and
historical allocation amplifies the bias. Despite these
predictable biases, all four methods are consistent with
Article XIII. The sub-paragraphs on supplier quotas,
XIII: 2(c) and 2(d), where the contradiction between
advocacy of nondiscrimination and tolerance—if not
advocacy—of discrimination is most clearly displayed.
GATT Article XIII: 2(c) states: “Except in the case of
supplier tariff quotas import licenses shall not require
that the imported product originate from a particular
country or source.”
Supplier tariff quotas, also known as “allocated tariff
quotas,” are tariff quotas that are allocated to supply-
ing countries, rather than to domestic importers or
traders. The particular country or exporting firm and
country is specified by the assignment of the tariff
quota rights. Article XIII: 2(c) essentially states that
importing countries can employ TRQ rights as a
GATT-consistent means of discrimination.
GATT Article XIII: 2(d) states:
In cases in which a quota is allocated among sup-
plying countries, the contracting party applying
the restrictions may seek agreement with respect
to the allocation of shares in the quota with all
other contracting parties having a substantial inter-
est in supplying the product concerned. In cases in
which this method is not reasonably practicable,
the contracting party concerned shall allot to con-
tracting parties having a substantial interest in sup-
plying the product shares based upon the propor-
tions, supplied by such contracting parties during
a previous representative period, of the total quan-
tity or value of imports of the product, due
account being taken of any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting the trade in
the product. (emphasis added)
The two phrases italicized here have been the subject of
further definition by the GATT in a series of interpretive
notes to Article XIII. The convention has been to use an
average of the 3 years prior to the imposition of a restric-
tion as the representative period. Several disputes have
arisen over base periods during which there were other
restrictions on trade. The GATT recommends that shares
be allotted according to the trade shares “which would
correspond to what could reasonably have been expected
in the absence of restrictions.” Once again, this is the
free trade counterfactual distribution of trade, the opera-
tional equivalent of nondiscrimination.
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With regard to the meaning of special factors, Article
XIII, GATT states:
The term special factors as used in Article 22 
[of the Havana Charter] includes among other
factors the following changes, as between the
various foreign producers, which may have
occurred since the representative period:
1.  Changes in relative productive efficiency;
2.  The existence of new or additional ability 
to export; and
3.  Reduced ability to export. 
Thus XIII: 2(c) and 2(d) instruct member governments
that they are allowed to transfer TRQ rights to incum-
bent exporters, but they should do so in such a way as to
approximate the free trade counterfactual distribution of
trade. This is not a simple task. The passage above eluci-
dating the term “special factors” gives the impression
that exporter shares can be reallocated in line with
changing economic conditions, presumably without
compensation. However, once exporters are vested with
quota rights they tend to become upset when there is the
least suggestion of taking them back or transferring them
to a competitor. The author is unaware of a case where
this kind of reallocation has occurred in accordance with
Article XIII. The lack of such reallocations is hardly sur-
prising. The primary reason an importing government
chooses to allocate a “supplier quota” is to appease sup-
pliers harmed by the imposition of a quota. The U.S.
tobacco and sugar TRQs are examples. The quota rights
are non-transferable; and the product delivered in-quota
must be the domestic product of the exporter. Such
restrictions are the cause of biased trade shares and often
of quota underfill, as the U.S. tobacco TRQ example
illustrates. The corollary to the last statement is that
removing such restrictions can remedy, or at least sub-
stantially reduce, the risk of bias and underfill.9
Resale Markets in TRQ Rights
When TRQ rights are not transferable, one must export
to realize the (compensatory) rent. Thus the distribu-
tion of rent and the distribution of trade are correlated.
Allowing the transfer of TRQ rights liberates the dis-
tribution of trade from the distribution of rent. From
the perspective of the WTO, the only relevant consid-
eration is the distribution of trade, not the distribution
of rent. This means, for the purpose of evaluating
alternative methods of TRQ administration on the
basis of nondiscrimination, one should ignore the
redistribution of rent. Of course, it is the redistribution
of rent that drives much of the politics of quota admin-
istration. As Gardner (1983) has demonstrated, the
transfer efficiency of commodity programs (including
schemes analogous to supplier quotas) is relatively
low. It is far more efficient to compensate legitimate
rent claimants by direct monetary transfers than
through discrimination and manipulating markets.
The result above holds only if there is no resale of
quota rights. Resale can reclaim much of the dead-
weight loss caused by extramarginal suppliers’ displac-
ing inframarginal suppliers. If there are no transactions
or information costs, and all agents are rational profit-
maximizers, then extramarginal quota holders will sell
their quota rights to inframarginal suppliers discrimi-
nated against by quasi-market allocation processes.
These trades, in a perfect market, occur at the price R,
the marginal auction bid defined earlier. Extramarginal
quota holders value quota at R or less, while inframar-
ginal suppliers value the quota at R or more. 
When resale is allowed, the final distribution of rent
will differ from auction allocation only in that the
TRQ sales revenue is captured by private traders rather
than by the government. Suppliers inframarginal to W
who receive quota rights keep them; suppliers extra-
marginal to W who gain quota rights in the primary
allocation sell them. Essentially the auction
revenue/rent is redistributed from the government or
auction authority to private agents. Some countries,
states, and provinces allow the resale of quotas and
quota rights. In fact the government often organizes
and supports the market exchange institutions.10 Quota
or rights trade has been allowed or devised to reduce
air pollution and to prevent over-fishing. 
U.S. Sugar TRQ: An Example of 
Historical Allocation
The U.S. sugar tariff quota is allocated to exporting
countries on the basis of their “olympic average” market
shares of U.S. sugar imports, 1975-81. This was a peri-
od of exceptionally high world sugar prices. So high, in
fact, that in 1975, the United States removed the quanti-








9Skully (2000) evaluates the historical allocation of U.S. TRQs for
peanuts, tobacco, and sugar.
10Alston (1986) examines egg quota trading in Australia. Dairy
quotas are analyzed by Barichello (1996) and Chen and Meilke
(1998) for Canada, and by Oskam (1991) and Pennings and
Meulenberg (1998) for the European Union. Rucker, Thurman, and
Sumner (1995) study the transfer of flue-cured tobacco quota in
North Carolina.1934. During several months of the base period, the
world price of sugar exceeded 30 cents per pound. At 30
cents, virtually everyone was an inframarginal sugar
supplier. The market shares of U.S. imports during the
base period 1975-81 included suppliers who were infra-
marginal for a few months, but were extramarginal
under ordinary market conditions.11
Skully (1998) examines the pattern of imports for
“quota-exempt re-export sugar.” Raw sugar may be
imported to the United States outside the quota if it is
refined and re-exported within 90 days. This trade is not
distorted by tariffs or quotas—save for the embargo on
Cuba—and can be used as an estimate of the free trade
counterfactual distribution of trade. This distribution is
contrasted with the allocation of TRQ shares (fig. 7).
Low-cost sugar producers located relatively close to U.S.
refining centers in Gulf and Atlantic port cities dominate
the quota-exempt distribution of trade. 
The requirement that sugar imported under the TRQ
must be produced in the country allocated the quota
rights amounts to an anti-scalping law. This restriction
induces costly transactions. Taiwan, for example, has
tariff quota rights for the export of about 24,000 short
tons of sugar to the United States.12 Taiwan always
fills its quota; however, this is the only sugar it
exports. Taiwan’s domestic production does not satisfy
its domestic demand. It imports sugar (usually from
Australia or Thailand) to cover the difference, includ-
ing an additional 24,000 tons to cover the domestic
production exported to the United States. It would be
more efficient for Taiwanese quota holders to charter a
shipment of 24,000 tons of sugar from Queensland or
Guatemala to the United States and simply pocket the
arbitrage rents. Similarly, the Philippines, the third
largest quota holder (13 percent), has recently been
unable to cover its domestic needs from domestic pro-
duction. In fact, it has a TRQ to limit sugar imports.
To procure domestic sugar to fill its U.S. tariff quota,
the Philippine sugar authorities offered domestic mills
1.2 tons of imported raw sugar for every ton of domes-
tic raw sugar delivered for export to the United States. 
In both these examples, the ability to resell tariff quota
rights would improve international factor allocation.
Because the revenue from resale or arbitrage could easily
fund compensation (in the case of Taiwan) or fund
investment (in the case of the Philippines), the resale
would not have major domestic political repercussions.
This is not the case for all current sugar TRQ holders.
Several nations in the Caribbean region have both U.S.
and EU preferences for sugar exports (e.g., Guyana,
Barbados, St. Kitts-Nevis). Even with the quota rent
income, sugar production is, at best, barely a viable eco-
nomic activity. Because sugar production accounts for a
large share of domestic employment, and sugar workers
are well organized, the sale of quota rights would likely
precipitate mass layoffs and cause political problems. In
the absence of better alternatives, these governments






11Converting the absolute quota into a TRQ resolved a GATT dis-
pute between Australia and the United States. Australia contended
that the quota violated Article XI.
12A short ton is 2,000 pounds; a metric ton is 1,000 kilos or 2,
204.62 pounds.















GATT Article XIII governs the administration of quantita-
tive restrictions (QRs). QRs were effectively prohibited in
the Uruguay Round. Article XIII survives to govern TRQs
which, while legally and technically not QRs, generally
function as if they were QRs. Moreover, TRQs pose
administrative problems identical to QRs. A brief history
of the treatment of TRQs in international trade agreements
follows. The narrative focuses on an inherent conflict
between the GATT principle of nondiscrimination and the
rationing problem posed by TRQs.
Imports were rarely restricted with absolute quotas or tar-
iff quotas before World War I. The League of Nations
sponsored a series of World Economic Conferences during
the inter-war period, which attempted to reconcile how
quantitative restrictions could be administered without dis-
crimination, that is, consistent with Most Favored Nation
(MFN) principles. By 1930, four positions were evident:1
QRs are inconsistent per se with MFN.
MFN requires that each country receive an equal 
share of the global quota.
MFN can be approximated by allotting the global 
quota in proportion to the trade shares of current 
suppliers.
Allow the global quota to be filled on a first-come,
first-served basis.
The first position claims there is no just way to solve the
quota-allocation problem. The second position argues for
strict parity. If there are N parties to a trade agreement,
then a fair allocation gives each party exactly 1/N of the
global quota. The third position advocates proportionality,
and the just basis for proportionality is the observed vol-
ume of trade in some recent representative period. Finally,
the fourth position asserts (literal) priority in the form of
first come, first served. As the brief history below shows,
neither the League of Nations, nor the Havana Charter,
nor the GATT resolved this issue. Instead of advocating
one principle of distributive justice and proscribing all
others, Article XIII allows for a conflicting set of distribu-
tive principles. Predictably, this conflict leads to disagree-
ment about TRQ administration. 
Starting in the early 1920’s, political demands for agricul-
tural protection and intervention emerged in Europe and
North America. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands
remained resolute free traders until the United States
imposed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 and protec-
tionism cascaded. In 1932, the United Kingdom concluded
the Ottawa Agreement that established a system of “impe-
rial preference.” The United Kingdom increased its MFN
tariffs but granted a margin of preference to imports from
its imperial dominions; the dominions, in turn, increased
MFN tariffs but, also, they granted reciprocal preferences
to the United Kingdom. The Smoot-Hawley Act raised tar-
iffs on imports from all sources. By 1934, with the pas-
sage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), the
United States shifted to a trade strategy of “discriminatory
liberalization.” The RTAA generated a network of bilateral
preferences between the United States and selected trading
partners. By the outbreak of the World War II, Belgium,
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United States, among others, had developed systems
of discriminatory trade preferences. The Allies attempted
to maintain these systems after the war by incorporating
them into the Post-War order.2 The GATT, one of the three
pillars of the Post-War International Economic order,
required devices, for example, Article XIII to preserve
these obvious violations of the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion.3 Hudec (p. 178) notes:
When governments decided, after World War II, that
QRs would be permitted in many situations . . . [it]
became necessary to say, whether it was true or not,
that QRs could be applied in a manner consistent
with the MFN concept. And so GATT Article XIII
was written. Given its less-than-robust conceptual
heritage, it is a small wonder that Article XIII
proved to be a rather sickly child.
Article XIII is a “sickly child” because of a congenital
deformity. It advocates both nondiscrimination and dis-
crimination. The interpretation of Article XIII in this
report emphasizes advocacy of the principle of nondis-
crimination, the principle of distributive justice upon
which GATT is constructed. The text takes an in-depth
look at the subparagraphs of Article XIII that allow for
discrimination.
History of TRQ Governance in the GATT/WTO
1 Hudec, 1997.
2 See Skully, 1993 on competing visions of the governance of agri-
cultural trade in the 1940’s.
3 The three pillars were to be the International Monetary Fund,
IBRD, and International Trade Organization. The United States did
not ratify the Havana Charter to establish the ITO. The GATT is
the remnant of the ITO. Article 22 of the Havana Charter addresses
the administration of QRs. Almost all of Article 22 was incorporat-
ed into GATT Article XIII.might retain the quota rights to preserve the domestic
status quo.13
Discretionary Methods
Discretionary methods of TRQ administration delegate
the allocation process to a select group or organization.
In the case of state trading, import rights within the
TRQ (and sometimes outside the TRQ), are granted to
a specialized government bureau. In the case of
Producer Group administration, the import rights are
granted to an organization that represents producer
interests. How these organizations choose to exercise
TRQ rights is limited only by the discretion granted
them by their governments, or, in the case of producer
groups, by their membership. 
All TRQs administered by discretionary methods, 21
state trading TRQs and 9 producer group TRQs noti-
fied to the WTO for 1999, appear in table 2. A review
of the list reveals that Thailand and South Korea
account for the majority of state trading TRQs and all
producer-group TRQs. Most are for products that are
trivial from the perspective of global agricultural trade,
e.g., pine nuts, raw ginseng, onion seed, garlic, cap-
sicum, sesame, and potatoes. Eight state trading TRQs
are potentially important—four are for rice: Indonesia,
Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The Japanese
TRQs for wheat, barley, and dairy are important sim-
ply because of the size of the Japanese market. Finally,
there is the Thai tobacco TRQ. No producer-group
TRQ is particularly important. While few TRQs are
important from a global perspective, they may cause
conflicts among interested suppliers. 
Both state traders and producer groups tend to fill their
quotas if there is sufficient domestic demand. So,
quota-fill risk is generally not a problem under discre-
tionary administration; the problem lies in the distribu-
tion of trade. Because public or quasi-public officials,
not private traders, make import-sourcing decisions,
many factors divorced from commercial considerations
may determine market shares. That is, political consid-
erations play a major role. It would not be fruitful to
generalize further, because, unlike quasi-market meth-
ods, which can be reduced plausibly to algorithms,
each discretionary institution has it own methods, or,
perhaps more accurately, non-methods. The best one
can do, at least at this initial stage of TRQ analysis, is
to examine each individually. Thus, the balance of this
section consists of a case study of how the Japanese
Food Agency, a state trading organization, administers
the Japanese TRQ for wheat. This case study, which is
not a representative sample, was selected because of
available data and secondary information, as well as its
importance in U.S. agricultural trade diplomacy.
Wheat Imports by the Japanese Food Agency:
Discretionary Allocation
Japanese grain and oilseed imports are not uniformly
regulated. Corn, soybeans, and most other oilseeds are
imported with relatively few restrictions; rice, until the
Uruguay Round, was simply not imported; and wheat
imports were, and continue to be, controlled by the
Japanese Food Agency (JFA). The JFA has been noti-
fied to the WTO as a State Trading Enterprise (STE).14
The JFA is one of the world’s largest importers of
wheat. Consequently, it has been the subject of consid-
erable study. Unfortunately, much of the economic
analysis of the JFA’s import procurement decisions has
been predicated on erroneous “as if” assumptions
about the JFA’s objective function. This section draws
on one study that presents a persuasive argument about
the JFA’s objectives. Alston, Carter, and Jarvis (1990)
argue that the JFA operates a discriminatory quota
scheme for wheat, and that the Japanese Livestock
Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) operates a
similar regime for beef imports. Each year the JFA, in
consultation with the domestic milling industry and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
determines domestic consumption targets for wheat
and wheat products, estimates expected domestic
wheat production, and determines aggregate import
needs. The aggregate quota is procured by subcontract-
ing to a pool of about 30 trading firms. The contracts
specify the variety of wheat required as well as a des-
ignation: food wheat or feed wheat. As Alston et al.
show, the food-feed distinction is not particularly
meaningful. Rather, it allows an additional degree of
freedom in determining supplier market shares. At the
time Alston et al. drafted their article, only Australia
and the United States were permitted to supply feed
wheat. Canada was excluded as a feed-wheat source.
The essence of the Alston analysis is that the JFA’s
allocation of supplier shares for wheat is analogous to
a set of Voluntary Export Restraints (VER). A VER






13Trela and Whalley (1995) calculate the welfare loss caused by
the historical allocation of quotas by exporting countries under the
Multi-fiber Agreement.
14Ackerman and Dixit (1999) analyze state trading in agriculture
in a WTO context.shares quota rents with the exporting country that
could be fully captured by the importing country. By
the standard of domestic welfare maximization (the
assumption employed in many studies of the JFA), a
VER is clearly inferior to a global quota or its tariff
equivalent. If an importing country chooses a VER, it
reveals that the welfare of the preferred supplier(s) is
important to the importing country’s government. 
[T]he government in the importing country
attaches greater value to the appeasement of the
foreign interests than it does to the efficiency
costs of not using an otherwise economically
superior instrument. Thus, we can explain the
Japanese government’s use of managed import
quotas for beef and wheat, but to do so we must
allow for the political influence of import suppli-
ers. (Alston et al., p. 200)
Alston et al. based their conclusion on the observed
imports of the JFA and the LIPC through 1989 (when
they drafted the article), as well as supplementary evi-
dence from interviews with principals in the trade.
Supplier import shares are too stable, a telling piece of
evidence. A market-driven allocation would show
more variance than what is evident. As evidence of a
JFA bias for U.S. wheat and against Canadian wheat,
they note that Japanese milling firms consider Number
One Canadian Western Red Spring wheat (CWRS) the
most preferred variety. Mills always request more
Number One CWRS in their annual consultation with
the JFA, but the share procured remains too low in
their view. On the basis of this evidence, Alston et al.
concluded that a liberalization of the Japanese wheat
market, for example, converting the JFA’s discretion
over imports into a tariff equivalent or auctioned TRQ,
would result in a transfer of market share from the
United States to Canada. Moreover, they argue that per
capita Japanese wheat consumption is high and tariff
reductions are unlikely to increase the volume of
imports significantly. Consequently, liberalization
might lead to an absolute decline in the volume of
U.S. wheat exports to Japan. That is, the substitution
effect would dominate the expansion effect (Alston et
al., p. 210).
After a decade of additional trade data, we see if the
Alston, Carter, and Jarvis thesis holds. Figure 8 shows
the market shares of the three suppliers of wheat to the
JFA, the only suppliers. Shares are shown for food,
feed, and total (combined) wheat. Basic descriptive
statistics are included in figure 8. The shares are plot-
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1 :: :: :: ::scale. The annual shares are stable. The only change is
a minor increase in the Australian share of the food-
wheat market. The increase is gradual and steady, indi-
cated by the constant slope of the log-share line. The
Australian expansion in the food-wheat market is mir-
rored by the allowance of Canadian “feed-wheat”
imports—a minor innovation since Alston et al.
(1990).15
Arnade and Gehlhar (2001) analyzed monthly wheat
import data of 43 countries, which account for over 90
percent of world wheat trade, for evidence of importers’
market power. In their discussion of importers’sourcing
behavior during 1962-1995, they noted:
Most importers have shifted suppliers somewhat.
Japan however is a clear exception; its shares
have been stable. It sources nearly all of its
wheat from the United States, Canada, and
Australia in the fixed proportions of 55%, 27%
and 18% respectively.
Arnade and Gehlhar also examined the monthly trade
data for the frequency of multiple suppliers. They
argue that a high frequency of single-source observa-
tions may represent a series of corner solutions by
very price-sensitive importers. These countries buy
only from the least cost supplier. Conversely a high
frequency of multiple suppliers may reflect an inelastic
demand for a particular supplier’s product characteris-
tics, or, possibly a concern for a diversified supply. A
high frequency of multiple suppliers is also consistent
with the VER hypothesis of Alston et al. Arnade and
Gehlhar found that Japan has imported from its three
regular suppliers 95 percent of the time; in only 4 per-
cent of the months observed did it procure from only
two of the three suppliers, and in less than 1 percent of
the time from only one supplier. The persistence and
stability of its pattern of imports is consistent with the
VER hypothesis.
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15JFA prefers several Australian wheats for noodle production,
such as Australian Standard White (ASW). For example, the Eradu
and Gamenya varieties from western Australia are considered ideal
for udon noodle production. The formation of the Western
Australian Noodle Wheat Growers’Association in 1992, and the
Australian Wheat Board’s policy of testing and segregating noodle
varieties, initiated in the 1992-93 season, have further enhanced
Australian noodle wheat’s appeal in Asian markets. This may
account for the JFA’s administrative increase in the Australian
share of the food-wheat market. For development of varietal 
noodle wheats, see Crosbie (1994) and Lin and Vocke (1998). South Korea is the only country with a pattern of
wheat imports similar to Japan’s. The reason for this
similarity is that, until 1983, the Korean Flour Mills
Industrial Association (KOFMIA), a state-coordinated
umbrella organization, held monopoly control over
wheat imports.
The U.S. share of the Korean milling-wheat
import market was virtually 100 percent until
1983, when private importers were permitted to
enter the market. . . . U.S. milling wheat has
been displaced in the Korean market primarily
by Australian wheat, including Australian stan-
dard white (ASW), Australian Hard (AH) and
Australian Soft (AS). Canadian Western Red
Spring (CWRS) 13.5-percent protein wheat has
begun to make inroads and will probably 
capture a larger share of the market. (Raney 
and Morgan, 1994, p. 8)
Figure 9 plots the market shares of Korea’s major 
suppliers since 1980. The U.S. share since 1983, when
KOFMIA was liberalized, has averaged 50 percent.
The share is volatile, as expected in a competitive mar-
ket, and shows a secular decline. The Korean case can-
not be taken as a perfect counterfactual for the liberal-
ization of the JFA, but a decline in the U.S. share is
likely, and an increase in its volatility is certain.
The JFA fills its import quota, but this is not surpris-
ing. In practice, state trading poses a low risk of under-
fill. Competing suppliers carefully scrutinize TRQs
that implement Minimum Access commitments. If
there is market demand, quotas fill.16 The greatest risk
is that the discretion over sourcing, in the hands of
public employees, is particularly vulnerable to political
pressure. If such pressure alters the distribution of
trade from its tariff-equivalent counterfactual distribu-
tion, that is, based on supplier efficiency alone, it vio-







16If not, political pressure is applied, bilaterally or through the
WTO. The recently resolved United States-Philippine dispute over
the Philippines’ administration of its TRQ for pork follows this
pattern. The quota eventually fills.
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(percent)
Source: Korean Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade.
United States Australia Canada OtherConclusion
The economics of TRQ administration is clear if one
considers only the allocative efficiency of the various
methods of administration. The nondiscrimination
interpretation of GATT Article XIII advanced in this
report emphasizes allocative efficiency as the funda-
mental, normative principle of the WTO. The report
places no weight on the distribution of TRQ rents. On
this basis, market methods, such as auctioning quota
rights, dominate all others. Historical allocation and
discretionary methods are the least desirable. In the
context of WTO negotiations and TRQ administra-
tion, distributional effects—who gets the rent—does
matter and in the realpolitik of trade policy, may mat-
ter far more than allocative efficiency. The good news
is that there is no necessary trade-off between alloca-
tive efficiency and rent distribution—the two are sep-
arable. Quota auctions are the most direct means of
separation, but auctions are not the only means. By
allowing the resale of allocated quota rights, market
forces can match trading rights with inframarginal
traders. Resale realizes most potential allocative effi-
ciencies in product markets and eliminates most risks
of trade discrimination. 
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Appendix:  Underfill and
License on Demand
One can make some inferences about the level of
underfill when License on Demand is employed to
allocate quota rights. First, suppose that all trade is
conducted in some standardized container load of X
kilos. Call Z the tariff quota volume expressed in units
of container loads: Z = QTRQ/X. The total amount of
less-than-container-load shipments will equal N/2 full
container loads where N is the number of applicants.
This follows from the fact that the remainder is ran-
dom and uniformly distributed over the range (0,1)
with an expected value of 1/2. With N applicants, the
sum of remainders is N/2.
Call the critical load value k. Because the remainder
values are uniformly distributed, the expected value of
remainders less than k is k/2, and the expected value
of remainders greater than or equal to k is (1 - k) / 2.
Similarly the number of remainders less than k is kN,
and the number of remainders greater than or equal to
k is (1 - k) N. The quantity of underfill is the number
of loads less than k times the average quantity of such
loads: kN · k/2 = ½(Nk2).
Number of  Average
remainders N quantity 1/2
Number of  Average
0 loads kN quantity k/2
Number of  Average
1 loads (1 - k)N quantity (1 - k)/2
Expected 
underfill ½(Nk2) = kN · k/2
From the point of view of quota fill efficiency, the rel-
evant magnitude is the expected underfill as a propor-
tion of the quota. Define this value as U = Nk2/(2Z).
Consider how changes in the components of this mea-
sure influence the value of U. An increase in k, the
critical value of a shipment, increases underfill. The
higher the critical value, the less likely a less-than-full
shipment will be made. An increase in the number of
applicants, N, also increases underfill. This follows
because the number of applicants determines the num-
ber of less-than-full load remainders. Finally, increas-
ing Z reduces underfill. This follows simply because Z
is in the denominator, clearly with 2Nk2 invariant to Z,
an increase in Z must reduce U.1
The value of Z could increase for two reasons. First, the
quota could simply be expanded. Second, innovations in
shipping can change Z even if QTRQ is unchanged. If,
for example, smaller sized shipments become economi-
cally feasible, the number of kilos per shipment decreas-
es. Thus, the number of shipments allowed by the quota
increases: Z = QTRQ /X, reducing X increases Z.
Finally, when the quota ceases to bind, QTRQ > Q*
implies Z > Z*, all license requests are granted, there








20As long as Z > N, the value is invariant to the value of Z. When
Z < N, the expected license quantity is less than one and the
assumption of a uniform distribution of the remainder over the unit
interval no longer holds. When Z < kN the average applicant will
be granted a license for less than one critical load and therefore
will not choose to ship. The lower the value of Z below kN, the
more likely all applicants will choose not to ship and none of the
quota will be used.